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We report experimental generation of a noisy entangled four-photon state that exhibits a separa-
tion between the secure key contents and distillable entanglement, a hallmark feature of the recently
established quantum theory of private states. The privacy analysis, based on the full tomographic
reconstruction of the prepared state, is utilized in a proof-of-principle key generation. The inferi-
ority of distillation-based strategies to extract the key is demonstrated by an implementation of an
entanglement distillation protocol for the produced state.
Quantum entanglement can guarantee secure commu-
nication as demonstrated by Ekert’s protocol [1] for quan-
tum key distribution [2] (QKD), where the random key
obtained from a maximally entangled state is known ex-
clusively to legitimate users. A natural way to realise
QKD using imperfect noisy entanglement is to attempt
its distillation into the maximal form using local oper-
ations and classical communication [3]. This strategy
however may reduce the attainable key length or even
preclude its generation altogether, which follows from the
recently developed theory of private quantum states [4].
The secure key can be extracted in general at higher rates
than that implied by distillable entanglement, and even
from certain classes of bound entangled states.
In this Letter we report experimental generation and
utilization of a noisy entangled four-photon state that
exhibits the separation between secure key contents and
distillable entanglement. We perform a full tomographic
reconstruction of the produced state using the maximum-
likelihood [5] and Bayesian reconstruction methods [6, 7],
which allows us to obtain credible estimates for the quan-
tities of interest despite their nonlinear character and
high sensitivity to statistical noise and experimental im-
perfections. We present a proof-of-principle extraction of
a secure key and implement an entanglement distillation
protocol verified to perform suboptimally.
The original example of extracting privacy from quan-
tum entanglement is Ekert’s QKD protocol, in which two
communicating parties—Alice and Bob—need a sequence
of bipartite systems prepared in a maximally entangled
two-qubit state such as |φ+〉 = 1√2
(|00〉 + |11〉). Lo-
cal projections performed by Alice and Bob in the com-
putational basis |0〉, |1〉 yield perfectly correlated ran-
dom key bits. The security is checked by measuring
the qubits in superposition bases to test coherence be-
tween the components |00〉 and |11〉. If the state used
for QKD is indeed pure, the monogamy of entangle-
ment [8] prevents an eavesdropper Eve from learning
measurement outcomes obtained by legitimate users. Of
course, a state |φ−〉 = 1√2
(|00〉 − |11〉) would be equally
suitable for key generation. But an equiprobable sta-
tistical mixture of |φ+〉 and |φ−〉 ensures no security.
This is because it can be viewed as a partial trace
1
2
(|φ−〉AB 〈φ−| + |φ+〉AB 〈φ+|) = TrE(|Φ〉ABE 〈Φ|) of a
tripartite state
|Φ〉ABE = 1√
2
(|00〉AB ⊗ |0〉E + |11〉AB ⊗ |1〉E) (1)
involving a qubit E in possession of Eve, who can gain
complete information about the results of Alice’s and
Bob’s measurements in the computational basis without
introducing any disturbance.
Suppose now that in addition to qubits A and B, Alice
and Bob possess also qubits A′ and B′ prepared jointly in
a statistical mixture of |φ−〉AB ⊗ |00〉A′B′ and |φ+〉AB ⊗
|11〉A′B′ . Obviously, a local measurement of A′ or B′
in the computational basis reveals whether the qubits A
and B have been prepared in |φ+〉 or |φ−〉. This enables
key generation and entanglement distillation with equal
rates. An intriguing case is the privacy of a mixed four-
qubit state [4]:
̺priv=
1
4 |φ−〉AB 〈φ−|⊗̺A
′B′
− +
3
4 |φ+〉AB 〈φ+|⊗̺A
′B′
+ , (2)
where ̺−= |ψ−〉 〈ψ−|, ̺+= 13 (1 − |ψ−〉 〈ψ−|), and we
denote |ψ±〉 = 1√2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). Unlike the preceding ex-
ample, the two operators ̺A
′B′
± cannot be discriminated
unambiguously by Alice and Bob using local operations
and classical communication, which lowers the value of
distillable entanglement ED [9]. This can be seen from
an upper bound
ED ≤ L = log2Tr|̺Γpriv| = log2 3− 1 ≈ 0.585, (3)
where L is the log-negativity [10] calculated for the par-
tial transposition Γ with respect to the partition AA′ :
BB′. In contrast, the theory of private states [4]—of
which ̺priv is an example—shows that results of project-
ing qubits A and B in the computational basis cannot
be learnt by Eve, thus providing one bit of a secure key.
This leads to a gap between the key rate and ED, imply-
ing general sub-optimality of distillation strategies.
2Figure. 1. Experimental setup. (a) Preparation of noisy pri-
vate states. Two maximally entangled photon pairs are gen-
erated in two nonlinear crystals XX, collected from four direc-
tions AA′BB′ shown in the inset, and subjected to polariza-
tion transformations implemented with quarter-wave plates
QWP and half-wave plates HWP. D, Soleil-Babinet compen-
sators; IF, interference filters; SMF, single-mode fibers. (b)
Polarization analyzers. PBS, polarizing beam splitter; MMF,
multi-mode fibers; APD, avalanche photodiodes.
In order to demonstrate experimentally this hallmark
feature of private states we generated a noisy entangled
four-photon states using a setup shown in Fig. 1. Its
heart were two 1 mm long type-I down conversion beta-
barium borate crystals with optical axes aligned in per-
pendicular planes, following the arrangement introduced
by Kwiat et al. [11]. The crystals were pumped using
Ti:sapphire oscillator (Coherent Chameleon Ultra) emit-
ting a 78 MHz train of 180 fs pulses frequency doubled in
a 1 mm long lithium triborate crystal to give a 390 nm
wavelength pump of an average power of 200 mW, and
focused to a 70 µm diameter waist. The axial symmetry
of type-I down-conversion implies that photons emerging
along any two opposite ends of the emission cone will be
maximally entangled. That way one can collect multi-
ple photon pairs, as shown in the inset of Fig. 1(a), and
obtain a four-photon state |φ+〉AB ⊗ |φ+〉A′B′ with |0〉
and |1〉 corresponding to horizontal and vertical polar-
izations. Collimated photons after transmission through
10 nm full-width-at-half-maximum bandwidth interfer-
ence filters were coupled into single-mode fibers wound
on manual polarization controllers. Phase relations be-
tween two-photon probability amplitudes were controlled
by two Soleil-Babinet compensators D placed in the path
of the pump beam and photons A.
Photons B were sent through a half-wave plate whose
two selected orientations introduced a transformation
σx = |0〉〈1| + |1〉〈0| or σz = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1|. The set of
two quarter-waveplates and a half-wave plate placed in
the path of photons B′ realized one of four operations 1 ,
σx, σz, or σy = iσxσz. Applying combinations σ
B
z ⊗σB
′
y ,
σBx ⊗ 1B
′
, σBx ⊗ σB
′
x , and σ
B
x ⊗ σB
′
z randomly with equal
probabilities produced ideally the state
̺id =
1
4 |φ−〉AB 〈φ−|⊗̺A
′B′
− +
3
4 |ψ+〉AB 〈ψ+|⊗̺A
′B′
+ , (4)
equivalent up to a local unitary to ̺priv. The secure
key can be obtained by measuring qubits A and B in
the eigenbasis of σy given by |v¯〉 = 1√2
(|0〉 + i(−1)v|1〉),
v = 0, 1.
The photons were detected using free space polariza-
tion analyzers constructed from a quarter-wave plate, a
half-wave plate and a Wollaston polarizer with two out-
put ports coupled into multimode fibers, connected to
single photon counting modules SPCM (Perkin-Elmer
SPCM-AQRH), as shown in Fig. 1(b). Detection efficien-
cies within each polarization analyzer, determined from
an independent macroscopic measurement, were equal-
ized in the postprocessing by binomial resampling. Elec-
tric signals from SPCMs were registered with a field pro-
grammable gate array (FPGA) circuit using a coinci-
dence window of 6 ns. Typical count rates were 105 s−1
for single counts, 6 × 103 s−1 for two-photon and 2 s−1
for fourfold coincidences.
Assuming that only four-photon events are available
to Alice and Bob, we reconstructed a density matrix of
a private state and performed a proof-of-principle secure
key generation. A complete measurement consisted of a
sequence of 33637 intervals, each 10 s long. Before a sin-
gle interval, settings of individual polarization analyzers
were selected randomly and independently on Alice’s and
Bob’s side to project polarization in the eigenbasis of σx,
σy, or σz . The density matrix of the generated state was
reconstructed from fourfold coincidences using two inde-
pendent techniques: the Kalman filter (KF) method [7]
based on gaussian approximation and Bayesian inference
which provides an a posteriori probability distribution on
the set of density matrices, and the maximum-likelihood
(ML) method with physical constraints [5]. In the KF
approach the resulting a posteriori distribution served
to generate a sample of 104 physical density matrices
with the help of the slice-sampling technique [12]. This
sample was used to calculate mean values and standard
deviations of individual elements of the density matrix
depicted in Fig. 2, as well as the information-theoretic
quantities reported in Eq. (7). Uncertainties of ML esti-
mates were obtained by generating 2000 reconstructions
using perturbed experimental data as an input. The
uncertainties calculated account for both the Poissonian
photon counting noise and 0.25◦ uncertainty of the wave-
plate orientation in polarization analyzers. Calculation of
the KF a posteriori distribution took 20 s on a standard
PC, a significant advantage compared with 20 min for
the ML method. A more time consuming stage, however,
3Figure. 2. Reconstructed private state. (a) absolute values of
density matrix elements in the σy basis reconstructed using
KF method. (b) diagonal KF values (orange, with error bars)
compared with the ML results (yellow).
was generation of statistical samples of physical density
matrices, which took 2 s per matrix using the KF dis-
tribution and required repetition each time of the full
reconstruction in the ML case.
Fig. 2 depicts the state ̺exp obtained using the KF
method. The fidelity F = Tr(√√̺id̺exp√̺id) of this
state is FKF = 0.9724(7), and the ML value FML =
0.9715(7) lies within the confidence interval. The figure
shows that the qubits A and B are indeed strongly corre-
lated in the basis |0¯〉, |1¯〉. To characterize the privacy of
these correlations, we consider a purification |Ψ〉AA′BB′E
of the complete system AA′BB′E in the worst-case
scenario when Eve controls all environmental degrees
of freedom E. Thus ̺exp = TrE
(|Ψ〉AA′BB′E 〈Ψ|),
which generalizes Eq. (1). After Alice projects the
qubit A onto a state |a〉, the state of Bob’s qubit
reduces to ̺
(a)
B =
1
pa
TrA′B′E
(
A〈a|Ψ〉AA′BB′E 〈Ψ|a〉A
)
,
while Eve is in possession of a system in a state
̺
(a)
E =
1
pa
TrA′BB′
(
A〈a|Ψ〉AA′BB′E 〈Ψ|a〉A
)
, where pa =
TrA′BB′E
(
A〈a|Ψ〉AA′BB′E 〈Ψ|a〉A
)
is the probability of
obtaining the projection onto |a〉 by Alice. An attempt
to gain information about Alice’s outcome by either Bob
or Eve can be viewed as a classical to quantum com-
munication channel A → B or A → E [13]. In such a
scenario—denoted as cqq—Alice and Bob can establish
a secret key at a rate at least
X cqq = χB − χE , (5)
where χB(E) is the Holevo quantity [14] for the respective
channel A→ B(E), defined as:
χB(E) = S
(∑
a
paρ
(a)
B(E)
)
−
∑
a
paS
(
ρ
(a)
B(E)
)
, (6)
S(·) denotes the von Neumann entropy, and the summa-
tions are carried out over an orthonormal basis of states
|a〉, in our case |0¯〉 and |1¯〉.
Based on measured data, the Bayesian a posteriori dis-
tribution for density matrices yields the following esti-
mates for the attainable key rate and the log-negativity
X cqqKF = 0.690(7), LKF = 0.581(4). (7)
These results show a clear separation, exceeding ten stan-
dard deviations, between distillable entanglement and
the key rate, exposing a fundamental feature of gen-
eral private states. The ML method yields consistent re-
sults X cqqML = 0.704(7) and LML = 0.578(4). The slightly
higher value of X cqqML may be attributed to the fact that
the ML method returns a lower-rank density matrix with
weaker entanglement between the system AA′BB′ and
the environment E.
The consistency of KF and ML results was verified
by calculating the Mahalanobis distance [7] between the
density matrices produced by both the methods with the
KF covariance matrix used as a metric. The obtained dis-
tance 16.8 is below the value 17.1 corresponding to a 95%
confidence interval. The KF method allows one to check
for the presence of systematic errors: since the mean of
the a posteriori distribution is not forced to be positive
definite, its Mahalanobis distance from the mean of the
distribution with imposed positivity constraints is an in-
dicator of possible systematic errors in the measurement
process [7]. For our data this distance is 17.7, implying
that systematic errors are not significant.
In order to extract a secure key from the four photon
state we selected randomly one event from each interval
when both the qubits A and B were measured in the
σy bases obtaining N = 3716 raw key bits. We simu-
lated a binary interactive error-correction procedure [15]
exchanging 990 parity bits, which corrected all errors,
and performed privacy amplification using two-universal
hashing functions. Using the KF estimate of Eve’s knowl-
edge in the asymptotic limit given by χE , conservatively
enhanced by five standard deviations, and adding a secu-
rity margin [16] to guarantee that the probability of Eve
learning at least one bit of the key is below 10−6, yields
2164 bits of a secure key.
4Figure. 3. Two-qubit AB state. (a) Absolute values of the elements of the reduced density matrix obtained by tracing out
qubits A′ and B′. (b,c) Absolute values of the elements of density matrices conditioned upon finding qubits A′ and B′ in
identical (b) or orthogonal (c) states when measured in the same basis.
The subsystems A′ and B′ play the role of a shield pro-
tecting the private key contained in subsystems A and
B from an eavesdropping attempt. Given ̺id, tracing
out A′ and B′ reduces the qubits A and B to a mixed
state ̺AB =
1
4 |φ−〉AB 〈φ−| + 34 |ψ+〉AB 〈ψ+|. The cor-
responding experimental state, shown in Fig. 3(a), has
X cqqKF = −0.009(4), which demonstrates that the shield is
critical to ensure security. The shield qubits can be used
to implement a simple entanglement distillation proto-
col for ̺id: if A
′ and B′ are projected in the same ba-
sis, identical outcomes collapse the state of qubits A and
B to a maximally entangled state |ψ+〉AB , while oppo-
site results produce a separable state 12
(|φ−〉AB 〈φ−| +
|ψ+〉AB 〈ψ+|
)
= 12 (|0¯0¯〉AB 〈0¯0¯| + |1¯1¯〉AB 〈1¯1¯|) useless for
key generation. Fig. 3(b,c) depict experimental condi-
tional density matrices reconstructed for these two cases
using the KF method. The key rate is positive only for
identical outcomes and equals 0.693(9), which multiplied
by the relative frequency of these events 0.511 yields the
average value X cqqKF = 0.354(5), falling significantly be-
hind the result reported in Eq. (7). Using the resulting
subset of qubit pairs to generate a key under the same se-
curity assumptions as before yields below 650 bits after
error correction and privacy amplification of 1859 raw
bits obtained from intervals when the qubits A and B
were measured in the same bases. Note that the 50%
reduction in the raw key length compared to the four-
photon key extraction corresponds exactly to the success
rate of the distillation protocol which halves the raw bit
rate if only compatible measurements yielding perfectly
correlated outcomes are applied.
In conclusion, we demonstrated experimentally a fun-
damental feature of private states, namely the sepa-
ration between distillable entanglement and the secret
key contents, using a noisy entangled state of photon
quadruplets. The results confirmed the sub-optimality
of distillation-based strategies to extract private correla-
tions. This highlights the complex nature of mixed entan-
glement in higher dimensions similarly to that exhibited
in multiparty scenarios [17] and paves the way to develop
QKD protocols that make optimal use of realistic imper-
fect resources.
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